Gunther Ginckels, auteur op SEASC4U

Local branch VOKA calls for the resignation CEO Port of Antwerp-Bruges

Posted on juli 24, 20241 reactie

A letter from Mrs Luwel and Pfeffer acting under the VOKA flag to the mayor of the city of Antwerp and the Alderman responsible for port, urban development, spatial planning and patrimony is demanding the resignation of Mr. Jacques Vandermeiren – CEO of the Port of Antwerp-Bruges. The press received a copy of the letter. The CEO of the Port of Antwerp-Bruges Mr Jacques Vandermeiren did not receive a copy of the letter.

A conflict with some major companies at the port, such as BASF, is said to be behind the demarche.

As the letter is addressing a conflict on Port of Antwerp-Bruges level one can wonder why it was not produced under the Alfaport-VOKA flag with Stephan Vanfraechem? Alfaport-VOKA aims for an accessible, enabling, cost-competitive and sustainable Antwerp port with a view to anchoring employment and added value in the port on a sustainable basis. So Alfaport-VOKA should be the prime driver in the relations between the Port related industry and the Port Authority.

Mr Luwen and Mr Pfeffer complain over the lack of open dialogue between the top management of the Port of Antwerp Bruges and the key stakeholders and customers of the beloved port. Luwel and Pfeffer write. “We see the same pattern every time: a lack of willingness to listen, an insistence on being right and a dogmatic attitude regarding the objectives as well as the path to be followed towards the climate and energy transition.”

As my granddad used to say; “it takes 2 to tango”. Likely it is a “both-to-blame” collision.

The main source of the conflict allegedly lies with BASF Antwerp, where CEO Jan Remeysen has been at the helm since 2020. There appears to be a wide gap between BASF Antwerp and Mr Vandermeiren policies and strategies. BASF established its presence in the Port of Antwerp in 1964. Since then, it has been an integral part of the region’s industrial landscape. Recently, in 2023, BASF was licensed by a.o. the Port of Antwerp-Bruges and expanded its ethylene oxide and derivatives complex at its site in the port of Antwerp. So what is the problem?

Vandermeiren is criticized to be too much at the forefront in the transition to hydrogen as a green energy source, without caring whether everyone is on board. As a port, Port of Antwerp-Bruges is strongly committed to developing infrastructure for green hydrogen. And yes, overall, the Port of Antwerp-Bruges with Jacques Vandermeiren at the helm is a frontrunner in renewal and innovation in climate and environmental actions, some examples of which are here.

Multifuel port

Over 90% of world trade goes by sea, which requires a lot of fuel. Port of Antwerp-Bruges is one of the largest bunker hubs in the world. It is the ambition of the Port of Antwerp-Bruges to be as much as possible a multifuel port to make various climate-neutral bunker fuels available in addition to the range of bio- and conventional bunker fuels.

Shore power

Shore power is an environmentally friendly and quiet way for ships to dock. Instead of using diesel generators, ships can connect to the electricity grid available at their berth. This reduces emissions and therefore contributes to the greening of ports. Numerous connection points are already available for barges and tugs. Port of Antwerp-Bruges is committed to also providing quayside electricity for the largest container vessels by 2028.

Antwerp@C

Antwerp@C is a project dedicated to innovative CO₂ reduction. Together with seven leading chemical and energy companies, Port of Antwerp-Bruges is working on the transition to a circular and climate-neutral port.

Hydrogen

Hydrogen plays an important role in the transition to a climate-neutral world. Port of Antwerp-Bruges is an active pioneer of the hydrogen economy and aims to take a leading position as a European import hub of green hydrogen.

Circular economy

In a circular economy, existing materials and products are shared, reused, repaired and recycled for as long as possible to create more value and close material cycles. The switch to a circular economy is part of the ambition of the Port of Antwerp-Bruges to be a climate-neutral port by 2050. The port area, with its industrial cluster, waste-processing companies and logistics sites, offers numerous opportunities to engage in circularity.

So much for the ambitions of the Port of Antwerp-Bruges with main driver CEO Jacques Vandermeiren and his Team. His policies and strategies are endorsed by the Board of Directors of the Port of Antwerp-Bruges consisting of 13 directors of which 9 politically assigned and 4 independents. So Luwel and Pfeffer also claiming the resignation of the Board of Directors?

The chemical industry has always actively contributed to the development of the port of Antwerp and its added value should certainly not be underestimated nor ignored. Study and research have nevertheless brought some less positive issues to light in recent years – not least the 3M scandal and PFAS pollution. The BASF expansion into ethylene oxide is likewise controversial. Ethylene oxide is harmful to the environment because of its toxicity and potential to contaminate water and soil.

But let’s go back to the letter of Mrs Luwel and Pfeffer. The letter also includes this remarkable chapter. “In the absolute majority of companies, there is a strong feeling of incomprehension, a lack of respect, and an attitude bordering on arrogance on the part of the top management of Port of Antwerp-Bruges. For a CEO of a de facto public administration, which depends to a very large extent on revenues from customers, this is inappropriate and worrying,” The writers are raising the alarm after a conversation between Vandermeiren and “senior representatives” of the very biggest players (BASF?) in our port got out of hand last month.

Who are these “majority of companies”? Where the writers have a valid point is that the Port of Antwerp-Bruges is de-facto a “public administration” which means beyond the range of BASF and 3M companies alike. It means that the Port of Antwerp-Bruges is accountable towards the public – not an alleged “absolute majority of companies”. Likewise, its CEO is accountable towards the Board of Directors.

The port of Antwerp-Bruges hosts 1.400 companies creating a total added value exceeding 20 billion euro representing 4,5% of the BNP of the Kingdom of Belgium. Today, the port of Antwerp-Bruges provides no less than 74,000 direct and 90,000 indirect jobs and is by far the biggest economic engine in the country.

If BASF is the main issue the letter represents 0.07143% in terms of companies and with 4000 workers 2,44 % of the workforce of the Port community.

It is remarkable that Alfaport-VOKA or his DG Stephan Vanfraechem, which are the voice of the port-related companies in the port of Antwerp-Bruges, is nowhere mentioned. What is his position on this?

So, it appears to be much more a clash of EGO’s. Little substance, no facts and figures and suspected conflicts of policies and strategies of “some” (?) important industry players on the one side and the common and public interests of the shipping & logistics industry represented by a.o. the Port of Antwerp-Bruges Authority on the other side.

Luc Luwel has been in charge of VOKA for many – maybe too many – years. Luwel is considered a great advocate for the interests of industry but is not an impeccable figure himself. His style is also considered arrogant, and he likes to be surrounded with all the honours while being a representative of an interest group in function of the companies. Did his weight loss also impacted the acid level balance in his system?

For this reason, did Fernand Huts of Katoen Natie turned his back on VOKA out of dissatisfaction with Luwel’s policies and behavour

Luwel and Pfeffer’s action has been labelled in port circles as “self-serving”. In a reaction, the Antwerp Shipping Association (ASV) says it does not support frontal attacks on the CEO of Port of Antwerp-Bruges.

Meanwhile, VOKA Antwerp-Waasland confirmed the letter to the Antwerp city council but nuanced the content. “The relationship between the private port community and the CEO of Port of Antwerp-Bruges has been thoroughly disrupted”. That Luwel and Pfeffer themselves are the cause of this disturbed relationship has apparently not dawned on them.

The name of Alderman Koen Kennis (N-VA) was already circulating as a possible successor to Jacques Vandermeiren. He can add this function to the 21 other mandates he “handles”. Although we had many very competent politicians as Alderman of the Port of Antwerp – who are also chairman of the Board of Directors – it appears wise to keep these functions separated. Do we really want a politician as CEO of the Port of Antwerp-Bruges?

Otzma Yehudit, Hamas, Religious Zionism, The Islamic Republic and Ayatollah’s, United Russia Party and other Global Criminal Organisations.

Posted on april 13, 2024Leave a comment

As Treasurer of the NGO Juventus I had a very interesting meeting with our Banker last week. On our question: “what would be a relative safe investment portfolio” he responded with a profound Global Political Analysis that was – to say the least – rather pessimistic. After that i realised that a large part of the Global conflicts are today religiously motivated. Lets start with the fundamentals of the Israeli drivers. The Torah, the first five books of the Hebrew Bible, contains several passages that some interpret as giving the Israelites a divine mandate to conquer and settle the land of Canaan, which includes the modern-day State of Israel. In the book of Deuteronomy, Moses speaks to the Israelites about their impending entry into the land of Canaan. He tells them that God has given them this land and they are to take possession of it. Over the century’s these rights have been subject to many interpretations but the extreme fascist Zionists still conveniently use this as their “right” to conquer and own the land today named “Israel”.

Surprisingly, the same 5 books of the Koran – the same as in the Thorah – do not claim the eradication of the Jewish people. The calls for the eradication of Israel by some Muslim leaders, such as Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, are based on political and ideological conflicts, not on teachings from the Koran. These leaders often use religious language and symbolism to rally support and justify their positions. They fundamentally abuse the Koran. For example, Hamas, an Islamic Palestinian group, has used the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the third holiest site in Islam, as a rallying cry to unite Muslims. They argue that their faith is under assault and call for action against Israel. The foundation of Hamas lies in the ignorance of the 1948 UN resolution by Israel. The fascist extremisme of Otzma Yehudit and the Zionist movements are daily applied on the Westbank where Israeli extremists chase Palestinian Families from their homes and take possession of their properties.

And than there is Vladimir Putin’s motivations for invading Ukraine. Putin has expressed a desire to protect Russian-speaking people in Ukraine. He has also voiced concerns about Ukraine’s growing ties with the West and its aspirations to join NATO. Putin views the expansion of NATO towards Russia’s borders as a security threat. So much for the anxiety disorder of Putin. Than there are the Personal Factors. Some reports suggest that personal resentment and a desire for revenge were driving factors behind Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine. This mental condition is called “Narcissistic Personality” Disorder. However, behind this mask of extreme confidence lies a fragile self-esteem that’s vulnerable to the slightest criticism. And than there is the Fear of Democracy. Another perspective suggests that Putin’s fear of democracy, particularly the idea of a successful democratic state on Russia’s border, convinced him to invade Ukraine. He is also strongly motivated by the corrupt Russian Orthodox Church.

So much of these global conflicts are religious motivated.

It brings me to the Dutch Theologue Harry Kuitert. Here is what he found;

First there was his thesis that faith has an ‘anthropological floor’. That is, Religion is time-bound. Religion is human work, with all the limitations and errors that speaking about it and its transmission can entail.

Therefore, believing is not the acceptance of doctrines that have been handed down and handed down as true, but involves the task of looking at statements of faith as a ‘search design’ and searching for what is credible and what is not (anymore).

Further the consequence of this is the thesis: “All speech about Above comes from below, including speech that claims to come from Above”. It eventually leads to the conclusion that faith, including belief in a God, is “of imagination”, created by man who thus tries to give meaning to a chaotic and profoundly meaningless existence. Yet, faith certainly does have substance, though that is the substance people give it, faith is human imagination. Faith, however, must be tested continuously, it is ultimately about reliable knowledge. Definitive testing is not possible.

Is it okay to doubt?

Yes, according to the scriptures in all religions, it is permissible to doubt. The Christian faith recognises that doubt can be a part of the life of faith. Doubts can be both objective and subjective, and can sometimes be dispelled by pointing to the strong historical basis of faith.

In the context of “search design”, doubting is therefore a task and a constant. Keep searching and when you find, search further and further.

So what these extremist religious “leaders” fail to do is to accept doubt and be open to dialogue. Instead they enforce their rules and lifestyles on the world with no regard to the well-being of Gods creation.

It brings us to the concept of “stewardship” which appears in the Thora and Koran, but it is not used specifically to express our responsibility towards the creation. An example is Genesis 2:15, where Adam is appointed to till and maintain the garden of Eden. This means that man is tasked with carefully managing God’s creation.

And that is what all these so called Leaders fail to do – on the contrary – they seek to destroy God’s creation and all living creatures as fast and profoundly as possible.

Shame on all.

TradeLens

Posted on december 2, 2022Leave a comment

Surprise, Surprise. Logistic players including shipping companies are not willing to share sensitive data on the TradeLens platform, so it is decided to close it down.

Maersk announced that it had failed to find willing collaboration globally with all stakeholders in the industry and, as a result, TradeLens was no longer viable as an independent company. Here Maersk’s explanation and motivation why they close TradeLens.

Distrust or….
Lack of trust from rival companies is cited by Maersk as the main reason why it is aborting TradeLens. Main reason: some key central players refusing to share their data on the platform. As many as five of the six largest container shipping companies, and therefore at the same time competitors of Maersk, signed up to the platform. But the necessary trust between the parties was never there says Maersk.

TOP-Five Container Carriers controlling over 60% of global containerisation failing.

Hapag-Lloyd had previously opted not only to bet on TradeLens, but also on Asian counterpart: GSBN (Global Shipping Business Network). COSCO is said to have already set up a partnership with GSBN.

MSC reveals that it is involved in yet another platform. MSC states that they continue to believe that data and document sharing through digitisation remains essential to make container shipping and logistics more efficient, safe and sustainable,” BlaBlaBlaBla….

So, each of the TOP-5 carriers will run “their” platform. Like that will solve the refusal of data-sharing ?

In the meantime, containers end-up in bottleneck terminals unable to move swiftly due to lack of information – read refusal of data sharing. It impacts the efficient transfer from ships-stow to final delivery point – due to lack of information sharing – as it is unknown where a container needs to end-up when loaded in Shanghai. All Logistic stakeholders without exception are refusing to share essential data allowing modal shift and – lets pray – one day to synchromodality whereby the E2E process of a container is flawless, efficient and tailormade to the need of the cargo and its owners. But then again: are there Container Carriers who really care of the cargo owners?

ALFAPASS

Posted on oktober 28, 2022Leave a comment

Dit verhaal begint met een brief van een gerechtsdeurwaarder in de brievenbus, een ervaring die ik nog nooit heb mogen meemaken en nu met Alfapass voor de eerste maal. Met licht opgetrokken wenkbrauwen alweer een levenservaring rijker.

Het vermoedelijke onderwerp van de “Minnelijke ingebrekestelling” is badge 167460 van Alfapass CV over een rekening INV22-013557 van 20/06/2022 voor een bedrag van 72,60 Euro. Die factuur heb ik op 20/06/2022 ontvangen en besloten deze niet te betalen. Reden voor mijn beslissing; de betrokken alfapass badge expiry date is 22/06/2022 en ik heb deze niet meer nodig. Ik besluit ook niet te reageren omdat eerdere berichten van Alfapass duidelijk maakten dat de badge al op 01/11/2021 onbruikbaar was omdat ik ze niet had laten vervangen door een nieuwe Alfapass kaart en deze dus niet meer geldig was. Ik citeer uit een e-mail van Alfapass van 01/05/2021: “In dat kader vragen wij U om volgende Alfapass-kaarten die gekoppeld zijn aan uw firma te laten vervangen en dit voor 01/11/2021. Na deze datum zullen deze Alfapass-kaarten mogelijks niet meer bruikbaar zijn” Ik mocht er dus vanuit gaan dat ik met ingang van 01/11/2021 geen Alfapass abonnement meer had.

In de loop van 2022 ontvang ik verschillende e-mails (zie lijst met datums) met dezelfde boodschap geruststellende boodschap waarin wordt bevestigd dat mijn abonnement niet meer geldig is en ook niet automatisch wordt verlengd.

28/03/2022 – 14/04/2022 – 14/06/2022 – 14/07/2022 – 14/08/2022 – 28/04/2022 – 28/06/2022 – 28/07/2022 – 28/08/2022 – 28/09/2022 – 28/10/2022.

Bedrijfsnaam: SEASC4U – Klantnummer: 10771 Aantal abonnementen die volgende maand automatisch verlengd worden: 0

Ik ontvang ook betalingsherinneringen op 21/07/2022, 04/08/2022 en 11/08/2022

Ik citeer:

“Gelieve de achterstallige facturen per kerende te voldoen en dit binnen een termijn van 15 dagen of uiterlijk tegen 5-8-2022. In overeenstemming met artikel 8.6 en artikel 11.1 van onze algemene voorwaarden worden de betreffende kaarten en/of abonnementen, waarvoor werd gefactureerd, bij niet-betaling en alleszins op hun vervaldatum, geblokkeerd. U kan uw betaaldocumenten online raadplegen via onze applicatie op”

Dus weer een bevestiging dat mijn Alfapass niet meer geldig is en dat er dus geen abonnementen of facturen dienen te worden betaald.

En dan is er vandaag de “Minnelijke ingebrekestelling” van gerechtsdeurwaarders F. Jennes, J. Behaeghel en P. De Neef namens Alfapass CV

20/06/2022 Factuur INV22-013557 72,60 EUR
20/07/2022 Wettelijke verhoging 40,00 EUR
25/10/2022 Intresten 1,54 EUR
25/10/2022 Inningsrecht 15,92 EUR
25/10/2022 Aanmaning (Art.7 KB 30.11.76) 22,21 EUR
Totaal onder voorbehoud 152,27 EUR

Alfapass bestaat nu al vele jaren en is in het kader van veiligheid van onze prachtige Haven Antwerp-Bruges een meerwaarde. Het is daarom spijtig dat Alfapass CV op administratief vlak zo slordig en intimiderend te werk gaat en daarom betrek ik ook de aandeelhouders / bestuurders in deze omdat ik vrees dat ik niet het enige slachtoffer ben van deze administratieve praktijken.

Om af te sluiten; Alfapass heeft geen gronden om de betaling van factuur INV22-013557 te eisen, mijn abonnement op badge 167460 was verlopen op 01/11/2021 en neen ik wens mijn abonnement op Alfapass niet te vernieuwen of verlengen, neen ik betaal factuur INV22-013557 voor het onbestaande abonnement 2022-2023 niet en neen ik betaal de onterechte vordering JDB543669 van gerechtsdeurwaarders F. Jennes, J. Behaeghel en P. De Neef niet.

MSC buys Bolloré Africa

Posted on april 1, 2022Leave a comment

€ 5.7 billion is the MSC bid for 100% of Bolloré Africa Logistics which has now been accepted. It covers all transport and logistics activities in Africa.

The Swiss-Italian – Aponte family group got access to the data room and started audits and contractual negotiations. Employee representatives of both groups have also agreed after successful negotiations with employees. So both groups reached an agreement on the acquisition based on a net value of the minority interests of EUR 5.7 billion.

The acquisition is still subject to approval by the relevant competition authorities and the agreement of some of Bollore Africa Logistics counterparties which are expected to be finalised within 12 months.

Bollore Africa Logistics is present in 42 ports and manages 16 container terminal concessions in 8 West-African ports. The group also owns three rail concessions in Africa, namely Sitarail, Camrail and Benirail whereby landlocked countries are connceted to ocean ports.

This network will be in the hands of MSC, which will become the largest transport and logistics operator in Africa adding terminals in Togo and Ivory Coast with TIL (Terminal Investment Group.)

So far, so…….. How does this re-desings the West-African shipping, ports and logistics lanscape ? Lets analyse the West-African tango of the two largest container liner operators and add APM Terminals-Maersk to the picture. APMT has terminals in Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Côte’Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda. Lets add Bollore’s – read now MSC’s – 16 container terminal concessions in, among others, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Congo, Togo and Guinea-Conakry, 7 ro-ro terminals, 2 timber terminals. With TIL MSC had already a presence in Togo and San Pedro. Maersk and MSC have share-swaps in a.o. Guinee-Conakry and Liberie-Monrovia. In several other ports they are in JVC’s with Bollore – now MSC. When adding-up, more than 60% of the West_African container handling capacity on Africa’s westcoast is in hands of only 2 operators – MSC and Maersk.

If such a move would occure in Europe or the USA we would see red-lights flashing with the EU & US antitrust authorities. Not in Africa (yet).

Already for some time we see a considerable difference in handling cost in West-Africa ports which is min/max Usd 100/320 compared to the rest of the world Usd 80/155. Offcourse labourcost in Africa is also about double – right ? Or is the other way around ? On the inland logistics side related to landlocked countries we see an import container from Tema (Ghana) to Ouagadougou (Burkina-Faso) taking abt. 13-22 days at cost of Usd 4,800.- while the same move from Newark to Chicago takes 5 days and cost Usd 654.- Export containers move slightly faster and cheaper. How will MSC develop the Railproject Abidjan – Cotonou ? Will MSC – Maersk allow competition or “adjust” their pricing policies to meet their economic objectives ?

And what will be the herritage of Vincent Bollore’s activities in West-African ports.
SPECIAL REPORT: How Vincent Bolloré won control of Ghana’s biggest port | Article | Africa Confidential (africa-confidential.com) And that is only Ghana. He already settled the Togo case for Euro 12 millions. Will MSC be able to trace all the historical hidden “arrangements” made by Bollore – if there are any.

Is it all bad news – well its news and every downside has also an upside. Lets look to the study made by the CSIS – Centre for Strategic International Studies.
190604_AfricaPorts.pdf (csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com) . Can MSC – Maersk be a counterbalance against the strangling port financing, investment and construction heists ?

West-Africa remains a Political unstable region where key factors for top-decision makers are a fast payback and a good and steady return on investment. You never know which military boys band sings next and where you will end-up. Best example is the Necotrans experience in Conakry and how it ended when a new president handed-over the port concession manu-military to Bollore. The rest was for his Turkish friend Erdogan. Lets see how Special forces commander Mamady Doumbouya will react to the MSC take-over.

To be Continued…….

Urgent need to expand container capacity in the Port of Antwerp – Realy?

Posted on oktober 16, 20211 reactie

A Simple Mind Viewer’s…. or KIS (Keep It Simple)

When Jacques Vandermeiren – CEO of the Antwerp Port Authority – pleads for more container capacity, the question is not how much but where and how. Is there still enough surface area between the Dutch border and the Antwerp Port area to create sufficient storage capacity? Should the expansion then only focus on quay wall capacity – because that gives space to receive more 21,000 TEU sea-going container vessels – or are phases 2 and 3 of container logistics also taken into account, i.e. the needed storage yard capacity and the transit to the final destination? Do the expansion plans also include sufficient quay and storage capacity for inland navigation? Or will we just go ahead and make Antwerp the bottleneck on the landward side? The shipowners do not want to see the problem. Once the container has been unloaded, it is no longer their problem, and if the containers remain at the terminal for too long, they will issue an additional storage invoice to the customer. The terminals do not see the problem either; full is full and they simply do not accept new containers until they have space again. And if the containers remain at the terminal too long because they cannot load them, they make a storage invoice to the shipping company – who then passes it on to the shipper. And so all parties remain in a vicious circle on their “burning platform”. What all parties especially excel at is finger-pointing, passing the buck and looking for artificial excuses – it is Corona, it is the Suez incident, blablabla. Attempts, for example, to share essential information with each other in order to make the logistical process run more efficiently are ignored.

Today, there are the waiting times for ships – ocean vessels, feeders and inland navigation – due to lack of berth capacity. Does the Port of Antwerp really need more container capacity? Yes, but today almost all parties asking for more container capacity have acute tunnel vision that only focuses on the sea – port route. Containers are now more frequently supplied by ships with a capacity of 21,000 TEU. If we put that in one line, that is a row of containers from Antwerp to Ostend, or 126 km. Fortunately, these 21,000 containers are not all discharged in one port, but on average, these ships call at three European ports and discharge approximately 5,000 containers in Antwerp, which, depending on the sailing area, represents an estimated 7,000 to 8,000 TEU – a row from Antwerp to Brussels or approximately 48 Km. What does this mean for Antwerp? In the first place, a shortage of quay length. A 21,000 TEU vessel requires more than 400 metres of quay. Most container terminals are still built on the basis of 320-metre ships. Secondly, 7,500 TEU based on 4 high requires a storage area of 62,000 square metres or 6.2 Ha. Thirdly, there is rarely a single container ship of 21,000 TEU to unload and load but the 3 major Antwerp container terminals each handle 2 to 3 of these ships at the same time. The “good” news is that the same ships also load containers and can thus relieve the pressure on the terminal’s storage capacity, were it not for the fact that you first have to unload a ship before you can load it, and the pressure on the storage capacity during the unloading and loading operations is exorbitant. And then? Those unloaded containers do not have the container terminal as their final destination and that is where the problem really lies.

There are 4 ways to get containers moved from the terminal. 1) by road, 2) by rail, 3) by another seagoing vessel and 4) by inland barges. On average, containers remain at the Terminal for 5 to 7 days. Removal by road is hampered by landside congestion and a shortage of road transport capacity due to a lack of drivers. Not all terminals have sufficient rail connections of their own and loading a train is always a combination of different destinations so that the wagons have to be rearranged at a later point to join a train to the final single destination. For other sea-going vessels – also called feeders – and inland vessels – also called barges – the same problem – shortage of berths – arises again. The average waiting time for a barge to get a berth is 4 to 7 days. The good news for Antwerp is that in Rotterdam it is now between 7 and 10 days’ waiting.

Philippe Oyen – chairman of the ASV – Antwerp Shipping Association – mentioned a number of other bottlenecks in his exposé during the “Get Together” this week. These included the “Law Major” and the irresponsible stubbornness of the port unions to continue applying 20th century rules to the 21st century logistics world. In container shipping, that problem is solving itself – container terminals where people no longer work but everything is robotised, warehouses where people no longer are needed to handle goods – so who needs Unions ? And they looked at it and had another beer, enjoying their union immunity.

The reputable British shipping consultant Drewry has raised its forecast for the collective gross profit of container shipping companies for this year for the third time, now to around USD 150 billion. That is more than five times the highest profit in the history of container shipping to date. In the second quarter of this year alone, container shipping realised an operating profit (ebit) of over 39 billion dollars, almost eleven times as much as last year. Shipowners will be able to use the pennies when they have to comply with the future EU Co2 emission standards that are on the table.

The market will adapt, although it will take 3-5 years before the impact is felt and near-shoring will be a major driver – both in the EU and the USA. The Chinese will feel it then. The European and US industry, logistics and ports have now learned their lesson – or maybe not – but JIT and controlled supply chain will start to shift. No more floating warehousing. Studies by the Antwerp University – Christa Sys and Van Elslander – have already proven that production and supply from low-wage countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey – and perhaps also the Maghreb – is not more expensive…. , closer to home and more controllable. And that was a study of 2019 when a 40FT Shanghai / EUR still cost $6,000 and not $20,000 as it does today. Suppliers of components “close to the waist” , shorter and less risky supply routes… And MSC buying “vintage” ships by the dozen, Maersk, CMA-CGM, COSCO having hallucinatory newbuilding programmes…. Within 3-5 years, they will be sailing with half-empty 21,000 TEU vessels and the empty containers will be piling up sky-high everywhere.

My daily contacts with inland navigation tell me that in Antwerp and Rotterdam they are confronted with waiting times of one week to 10 days, the terminals are at 110% of their yard capacity and the shipping companies, the inland navigation operators and the terminals send “surcharges” to their customers as the only solution. On some trades, these “surcharges” represent 25% of the total maritime transport price. And we all know who is footing the bill when doing groceries. There is no longer any limit to the shipowners’ creativity in passing on their own failures. Quite a feat for those shipowners – if they lose control over the goods flows and fail in their job, they earn even more. Perhaps we should subject the shipowners to KPIs and confront them with the consequences of their failing, i.e. recover the costs of their failure from the shipowners. But then again, they are also good at finding excuses – Corona, Suez incident etc….

The Future ?

Data-Sharing. Who: All stakeholders should share vital information with each other so that goods can move faster, more efficiently and in synchro-modality. Every day that a container can move faster to its final destination, 25% more terminal storage capacity is freed up.

Concession coupling. Who: Antwerp Port Authority – Concessions for operating container terminals must apply and reinforce the conditions relating to multimodal capacity. To this end, the 50/20/30 rule must be enforced, i.e. a minimum of 50% must be transported by barge, 20% by rail and 30% by road. The concessionaire must adapt its infrastructure, superstructure, quay and terminal capacity to this rule. This means that at all times 50% of the quay capacity is allocated with priority – not exclusivity – to inland shipping. There is sufficient rail capacity to form frequent trains which, after rescheduling, go on to direct trains to their final destinations. On the road transport side, sufficient gates should be provided which, in combination with reservation systems, can provide efficient handling.

Synchro-modality. Who: the Container Terminal Operators. They are the ‘spider in the web’ and must offer synchro-modality to their customers. This means that the Terminal Operator, on the basis of the information provided by the stakeholders, offers a synchro-modal product which brings the container from the seagoing vessel stowage position to its final destination by the Terminal Operator. He himself determines the transport mode, which can be a combination of road, rail and/or inland shipping, and the time by which the goods are expected at their destination with an element of cost.

All three are jointly needed to start improving.

Dringend meer containercapaciteit voor de Antwerpse Haven’

Posted on oktober 16, 2021Leave a comment

A Simple Mind Viewer’s…. of KIS (Keep It Simple)

Als Jacques Vandermeiren pleit voor meer containercapaciteit is de vraag niet hoeveel maar waar en hoe. Is er nog voldoende oppervlakte tussen de Nederlandse grens en het Antwerps Havengebied om voldoende opslagcapaciteit te creëren ? Moet de uitbreiding zich dan enkel focussen op kadecapaciteit – want dat geeft ruimte voor meer 21.000 TEU zeeschepen te ontvangen of houdt men ook rekening met fase 2 en 3 van de containerlogistiek d.w.z. de doorvoer naar de eindbestemming. Koppelt men in de uitbreidingsplannen ook voldoende kade en opslag capaciteit voor de binnenvaart ? Of gaat men gewoon door en wordt Antwerpen de bottleneck naar de landzijde toe. De reders willen het probleem ook niet zien. Eens de container is gelost is het niet meer hun probleem en als de containers te lang op de terminal blijven staan maken ze nog even een extra opslagfactuur aan de klant. De terminals zien het probleem ook niet; vol is vol en ze nemen gewoon geen nieuwe containers binnen tot ze weer ruimte hebben. En als de containers te lang op de terminal blijven staan omdat ze ze niet kunnen laden maken ze een opslagfactuur aan de reder – die het dan weer doorrekend aan de verscheper. En zo blijven alle partijen in een vicieuze cirkel op hun “burning platform” zitten. Waar alle partijen vooral in uitblinken is in vingerwijzen, zwarte piet doorschuiven en kunstmatige excuses zoeken – het is Corona, het is het Suez incident. Pogingen om bijvoorbeeld essentiële informatie met elkaar te delen en alzo het logistieke proces efficiënter te laten lopen worden koudweg genegeerd.

Vandaag zijn er de wachttijden voor schepen wegens gebrek aan ligplaatscapaciteit. Heeft de Haven van Antwerpen echt meer container capaciteit nodig ? Jazeker maar vandaag zitten vrijwel alle vragende partijen voor meer containercapaciteit met acute tunnelvisie die enkel gericht is op het traject zee – haven. Containers worden vandaag meer frequent aangevoerd met schepen met een capaciteit van 21.000 TEU. Als we dat op 1 lijn zetten is dat een rij containers van Antwerpen tot Oostende of 126 Km. Gelukkig worden die 21.000 containers niet allemaal in 1 haven gelost maar gemiddeld lopen deze schepen 3 Europese havens aan en lossen ze in Antwerpen ca. 5.000 containers wat afhangend van het vaargebied naar schatting tussen de 7.000 en 8.000 TEU vertegenwoordigd – een rij van Antwerpen tot Brussel of ca. 48 Km. Wat betekent dat voor Antwerpen ? In de eerste plaats een tekort aan kadelengte. Een 21.000 TEU schip vraagt meer dan 400 meter kade. De meeste containerterminals zijn nog gebouwd op basis van schepen van 320 meter lang. Ten tweede vraagt 7.500 TEU op basis van 4 hoog een opslagoppervlakte van 62.000 vierkante meter of 6.2 Ha. Ten derde ligt er zelden 1 containership van 21.000 TEU te lossen en laden maar behandelen de 3 grote Antwerpse containerterminals elk 2 tot 3 van deze schepen op hetzelfde moment. Het “goede” nieuws is dat dezelfde schepen ook containers laden en dus de druk op de terminal opslagcapaciteit kunnen verlichten ware het niet dat je eerst een schip moet lossen alvorens je het kan laden en de druk op de opslagcapaciteit gedurende de los – laad operaties exorbitant is. En dan ? Die geloste containers hebben de containerterminal niet als eindbestemming en daar wringt het schoentje pas echt. Er zijn 4 manieren om containers terug van de terminal te halen. 1) over de weg, 2) per spoor, 3) met een ander zeeschip en 4) met een binnenvaartschip. Containers blijven gemiddeld 5 tot 7 dagen op de Terminal. Het weghalen over de weg wordt gehinderd door congestie langs de landzijde en een tekort aan wegvervoerscapaciteit wegens gebrek aan chauffeurs. Niet alle terminals hebben voldoende eigen spooraansluitingen en het laden van een trein is altijd een combinatie van verschillende bestemmingen waardoor de wagons op een later punt dienen te worden herschikt om aan te sluiten aan een trein naar dezelfde bestemming. Voor andere zeeschepen – ook wel Feeders genoemd – en binnenvaartschepen – ook wel lichters genoemd – botst men alweer tegen hetzelfde probleem – tekort aan ligplaatsen. De gemiddelde wachttijd voor een binnenvaartschip om een ligplaats te krijgen is 4 tot 7 dagen. Het goede nieuws voor Antwerpen is dat het in Rotterdam intussen tussen de 7 en 10 dagen wachten is.

Philippe Oyen – voorzitter van de ASV – Antwerpse Scheepvaart Vereniging – heeft deze week tijdens de “Get Together” in zijn exposé nog een aantal andere knelpunten aangehaald. Onder andere de Wet Major en de onverantwoorde koppigheid van de havenvakbonden om 20^ste eeuw regels te blijven toepassen op de 21^ste eeuw logistieke wereld. In de containervaart lost dat probleem zichzelf op – container terminals waarop geen mensen meer werken maar alles gerobotiseerd is, magazijnen waar geen mensen meer nodig zijn om goederen te behandelen – en ze keken ernaar en pakten genietend van hun vakbondsonschendbaarheid nog een pint.

De gereputeerde Britse scheepvaartconsultant Drewry heeft zijn prognose voor de collectieve brutowinst van de container rederijen over dit jaar voor de derde keer verhoogd, nu tot rondom de 150 miljard dollar. Dat is ruim vijf keer zoveel als de hoogste winst in de geschiedenis van de containervaart tot nu toe. Alleen al in het tweede kwartaal van dit jaar realiseerde de containervaart een operationele winst (ebit) van ruim 39 miljard dollar, bijna elf keer zo veel als vorig jaar. De reders zullen de centen kunnen gebruiken als ze moeten voldoen aan de toekomstige Co2 uitstootnormen die op tafel liggen.

De markt zal zich wel aanpassen alhoewel het een jaar of 3-5 zal duren voordat het impact voelbaar zal worden en near-shoring zal daarin een belangrijke driver zijn – zowel in EU als in de USA. De chinezen zullen het dan wel voelen. De Europese en VSA Industrie, logistiek en havens hebben hun lesje nu wel geleerd – of misschien niet – maar JIT en controlled supply chain gaat wel stilaan verschuiven. Gedaan met “floating warehousing”. Studie van UA – Christa Sys en Van Elslander – heeft al bewezen dat productie en aanvoer vanuit lage loon landen zoals Roemenie, Bulgarije, Turkije – en misschien ook wel de Maghreb – niet duurder is…. , dichter bij huis en beter onder controle te houden. En dat was een studie van 2019 toen een 40FT Shanghai / EUR nog 6,000 USD koste en geen 20,000 zoals vandaag. Leveranciers van onderdelen “dicht tegen de gilet” 😊, kortere en minder risico-gevoelige aanleverroutes… En MSC die “vintage” schuiten koopt per dozijn, Maersk, CMA-CGM, COSCO die hallucinante nieuwbouwprogramma’s hebben…. Binnen 3-5 jaar varen ze met half lege 21.000 TEU schepen en stapelen de lege containers zich overal torenhoog op.

Mijn dagelijkse contacten met de binnenvaart vertellen me dat ze in Antwerpen en Rotterdam met wachttijden van een week tot 10 dagen worden geconfronteerd, de terminals op 110% van hun yard capaciteit zitten en de rederijen, de binnenvaart operatoren en de terminals als enige oplossing “surcharges” aan hun klanten sturen. Op sommige vaargebieden vertegenwoordigen die “surcharges” 25 % van de totale zeetransportprijs. En we weten allemaal wie bij Aldi, AH en Delhaize de rekening betaald. De creativiteit van de reders in het doorrekenen van hun eigen falen kent geen grenzen meer. Toch wel knap van die reders – als ze de controle verliezen over de goederenstromen en falen in hun job verdienen ze er nog extra aan. Moeten we de reders misschien eens aan KPI’s onderwerpen en bij onvoldoendes met de consequenties confronteren d.w.z. de kosten van hun falen verhalen op de reders. Maar ja, ze zijn ook goed in excuses vinden – Corona, Suez incident etc…

De Toekomst ?

Data-Sharing. Wie: alle stakeholders moeten met elkaar essentiële informatie delen zodat de goederen sneller, efficiënter en in synchromodaliteit kunnen bewegen. Elke dag dat een container sneller kan bewegen naar zijn eindbestemming komt er 25 % meer terminal opslagcapaciteit vrij.

Concessiekoppeling. Wie: het Gemeentelijk Havenbedrijf Antwerpen – Concessies voor de uitbating van containerterminals moeten de voorwaarden met betrekking tot multimodale capaciteit toepassen en versterken. Hiervoor moet de 50/20/30 regel worden afgedwongen d.w.z. dat minimaal 50 % over de binnenvaart, 20 % over het spoor en 30 % over de weg dient te worden aangevoerd en afgevoerd. De concessionaris dient zijn infrastructuur, superstructuur, kade en terminal capaciteit aan deze regel aan te passen. Dat wil zeggen dat er ten allen tijde 50 % van de kadecapaciteit met prioriteit – niet exclusiviteit – aan binnenvaart wordt toegewezen. Er voldoende spoorcapaciteit is om frequent treinen te vormen welke verder na herschikking op rechtstreekse treinen naar hun eindbestemming gaan. Langs de wegvervoerskant dient men voldoende gates te voorzien welke in combinatie met reserveringssystemen een efficiënte afhandeling kan leveren.

Synchromodaliteit. Wie: de Container Terminal Operatoren. Zij zijn de “Spider in the web” en moeten synchromodaliteit aanbieden aan hun klanten. Dat wil zeggen dat de Terminal Operator op basis van de informatie verstrekt door de stakeholders een synchromodaal product aanbied waarmee de container vanuit zeeschip stowage positie tot bij zijn eindbestemming wordt gebracht door de Terminal Operator. Hijzelf bepaald de transport mode welke een combinatie kan zijn van weg, spoor en/of binnenvaart en de termijn waarop de goederen op hun bestemming worden verwacht met een element kostprijs.

ARA Ports, Container Carriers & Surcharges on Multimodal Operations

Posted on mei 14, 2021Leave a comment

Again all stakeholders are pointing fingers to the splinters in the eyes of everybody else while not willing to see the beam sticking in their own eye.

And than there is COVID-19, the most convenient excuse to claim surcharges and implement excessive 10,000 Usd+ ocean freight levels. The MSC’s, CMA-CGM’s, Maersk’s, Hapag-Lloyd’s etc… now all hide their failure to anticipate on “unforeseen” events. Fortunately on top of the COVID-19 pandemic they also have the Suez incident. The consequences of all this is…. surcharges and market damaging measures.

Hapag-Lloyd is suspending their services between Europe, the Mediterranean and West-Africa. If you have a all-in deal with Hapag-Lloyd to deliver your containers inland they will conveniently route your container through German Seaports and add a congestion surcharge of 25 Euro / container – regardless the transportmode.

Maersk is informing their “Valued Customers” on a congestion surcharge to/from North West Continent main ports of 10,- Euro for Barge and Rail and 25, Euro for truck. It adds to their “very satisfied” 1st quarter report showing “record high levels” of EBITDA of Usd 4 Bn. Gateway EBITDA increase of 52%. And what to say of an EBITDA increase of 201% on Logistics & Services. Expectations Maersk Consolidated FYE 2021 +100%.

Will it be different with CMA-CGM and MSC when the CEO’s are now all ex Maersk executives ? What is the saying? When you host a tramp dog you als host his fleas. So its all the terminals to blame – is it ? With the Suez incident, and the diversion of ULCC’s over the Cape it was expected that ports and terminals would come under stress. From reliable sources i learn that terminals in the ARA Range are at 99% storage capacity and at a point where you can not move in any direction on the yard. So blame the Terminals. Or not ? See the explaining photo.

Just when I thought that it could not be more crazy ( Photo – Antwerp 2021-05-11 – 17:14). It shows one of the two PSA Scheldt Terminals in Antwerp with 2 small ocean container vessels alongside and out of the 14 cranes, 4 working the ocean vessel, 1 (read one) is working barges and 9 (nine) are idle. That would be O.K. if not approx. 5 to 6 barges are idle waiting for days for a slot for being handled and the general waiting / idle time for barges is 2-3 days. So what is causing congestion for inland navigation?

And do you know who pays for all these exorbitant freight levels and surcharges ? Yes, You and I when we buy pants and socks, laptops or dumb-phones. And since you and I are the “Silent Mass” it continues and nobody cares.

The port authorities say that the terminals and carriers are their customers – not the citizen-consumers. The Terminals say that the carriers and multimodal land operators are their customers – not the citizen-consumers. The carriers say that COVID-19 and Suez incident are the cause – not the citizen-consumers. The inland transport operators say that the carriers and the terminals are the cause of the inefficiency – not the citizen-consumers. And who pays the bill ? The citizen-consumer.

Nobody takes responsibility. Nobody feels accountable. And the Citizen-Consumer pays the bills. Where are these zillion consumer associations supposed to defend the interests of consumers? Where are our elected politicians supposed to defend the interests of citizens ?

ULCS’s, het verliezen van containers en de Suez Crisis.

Posted on maart 30, 2021Leave a comment

ULCS (Ultra Grote Containerschepen)

Zal dit de eye-opener en wake-up call zijn voor de container scheepvaart industrie? Waarschijnlijk niet, maar het geeft wel aanleiding tot enige reflectie over het concept van ULCS’s en schepen van meer dan 20.000 TEU.

Wat ik kan delen uit mijn ervaring. In 1999-2000 hadden we een ontmoeting met de ingenieurs van de werf die ons hun tekeningen voor grote containerschepen voorlegden. Het Terminal & Ports Team richtte zich op een aantal belangrijke vragen. Wat is de LOA en de breedte van deze schepen? Wat kan de max. diepgang van deze schepen zijn? Hoeveel rijen breed zullen ze vervoeren? Op basis van de antwoorden concludeerden we dat er geen enkele containerterminal ter wereld was die deze schepen aankon. De belangrijkste uitdaging was de combinatie van maximale diepgang, LOA en breedte. We realiseerden ons dat we alleen de breedte konden vergroten – niet de LOA – om de diepgangstoename te beperken. Toen werd besloten de terminals om te bouwen door de juiste kranen te installeren die deze schepen aankonden. Ja, dit was 20 jaar geleden, maar de inname van deze containerschepen op de tekentafel zou 10.000 TEU bedragen, dus de helft van de innamecapaciteit van de huidige ULCS’en met een inname van 21.000+ TEU.

Laten we een kleine inventaris maken van de huidige ULCS’s. Voorbeeld. HMM Algeciras. LOA 399,90. Inname in ruim 9.932 TEU (11 diep) en aan dek 14.032 TEU (9 hoog) – (vraag je je af hoe containers overboord kunnen vallen? ). Breedte 61 mtr. Max diepgang 16,2 mtr. Niet veel havens en terminals kunnen deze schepen aan. Het vereist een diepgang van ca. 17 meter, een aanlegplaats van 430 mtr en nog belangrijker kranen met een reikwijdte tussen 68 en 71 mtr om nog maar te zwijgen van hefhoogte tussen 49 en 51 mtr. De havens in de VS kunnen deze schepen in het algemeen niet aan. Azië is eveneens beperkt in capaciteit voor deze schepen en Europa is al enkele jaren in een kritieke ligplaats-capaciteitsmodus terechtgekomen waardoor deze schepen gedwongen zijn uit te wijken naar alternatieve havens. De Europese havens zijn een knelpunt geworden voor de wereldhandel. Bovenop de huidige ontoereikende aanmeercapaciteit voor de ULCS’, slagen de Europese containerterminals er niet in de containers efficiënt te verwerken. Het is geen verrassing dat zij er niet in slagen 4.000 tot 5.000 containers in minder dan 48 uur van de scheepsopslag naar het achterland en v.v. te verplaatsen. Vrachtwagens staan in de rij voor de poorten. Binnenvaartschepen liggen een week stil te wachten om containers te leveren en te ontvangen. De belanghebbenden blijven in gebreke bij de uitwisseling van kerngegevens over de containers, waardoor een efficiënte planning van de activiteiten en het beheer van de terminals onmogelijk wordt. Last but not least: alle spelers blijven in een staat van ontkenning en blijven met de vinger wijzen naar de anderen. Evenzo blijven zij allen de kosten van de inefficiëntie verhalen op de goederen. Congestieheffingen op wegvervoer en binnenvaart, tekorten aan containers waardoor vrachttarieven tot 10.000 Usd / FFE worden opgedreven, zijn aan de orde van de dag. U en ik betalen uiteindelijk de rekening in de winkels voor duurdere kleding, schoenen, voedsel, elektronica enz…

Al deze uitdagingen zijn niet nieuw. Een studie die ik in 2014 aan de havenautoriteiten van de ARA Range en de terminalexploitanten heb afgeleverd, heeft met feiten en cijfers aangetoond dat deze problemen toen al actueel waren en, tenzij ze dringend werden aangepakt, in de nabije toekomst alleen maar zouden verergeren. Die nabije toekomst is gisteren al aangebroken en sindsdien zijn de problemen verergerd tot een onaanvaardbaar niveau. En het zal niet snel worden opgelost.

En dit alles onder normale omstandigheden zonder Suez-crisis. Het in de rij staan van schepen in Suez is niet het grootste probleem. De “Ever Given” is nu gelicht en Suez is vrij en de honderden containerschepen naar het oosten en westen varen. De echte uitdaging zal vanaf midden april zichtbaar worden en gevolgen blijven hebben voor de logistiek tot ten minste eind juni 2021 – in het beste geval. In de tussentijd zullen fabrieken stil komen te liggen door gebrek aan onderdelen, zullen productleveringen meer dan een week op zich laten wachten enz… Misschien ook maar weer toiletpapier hamsteren.

Verlies van containers

MSC Zoe aan de Nederlandse kust – 200 containers. Maersk Eindhoven – 280 containers. One Apus 1.800 containers. APL Engeland – 40 containers. Verrast bij het stapelen van 9 hoog op het dek? Verbaasd bij het analyseren van de lashing systemen op deze ULCS’? Is het een kwestie van “hoogmoed komt voor de val” als een andere manier om arrogantie te beschrijven? Of hebben kostenbesparingen bij de bouw van deze schepen een grote rol gespeeld? Een dringende herziening van de lashing systemen op deze schepen zal nodig zijn. Tot die tijd zouden ze de deklading moeten beperken tot max. 5 of 6 hoog. Kunnen de nautische autoriteiten in de havens initiatieven nemen en hun verantwoordelijkheid opnemen? Moeten zij in het licht van deze recente incidenten ULCS met 9 hoog gestouwde dekcontainers uit nautisch oogpunt als onveilig beschouwen en de vaart ervan beletten? Of zal de commerciële druk op de havens een verdere ontkenning van het probleem en het risico in de hand werken? Als men beseft dat de meeste IMDG-geclassificeerde containers aan dek gestuwd zijn, kan men ervan uitgaan dat uitgebreide rampscenario’s geen kwestie zijn van “als” maar “wanneer”. Zelden heb ik meer gehoopt ongelijk te krijgen.

SUEZ Crisis

De crisis zal zich niet in Suez manifesteren. De gevolgen zullen merkbaar zijn in Azië en Europa, waar de havens het nu al moeilijk hebben om alle containerschepen te bedienen – om nog maar te zwijgen van de 20.000+ TEU schepen.

Vandaag, onder normale omstandigheden en zonder Suez-crisis, staan de schepen in de rij om de havens binnen te varen en een aanlegplaats te vinden. Geen probleem voor de vervoerders – zij factureren de lading gewoon met een congestietoeslag. Het wordt een gewoonte en bij de reders is het wondermiddel VATOS (Valid At Time Of Shipment). Reders die de extra kosten recupereren die veroorzaakt worden door hun gebrek aan bekwaamheid om efficiënte en doeltreffende scheepvaart diensten te leveren, worden slim aangepakt via VATOS. Maak u dus geen zorgen, u en ik betalen de eindrekening.

Wrap-up

Waar is het verantwoordelijkheidsgevoel van de reders? Zijn de vrachttarieven gedaald en hebben de verladers geprofiteerd van de schaalvoordelen door het gebruik van grotere schepen? Neen – integendeel, Azië/Europa is gestegen tot 10.000 Usd/FFE. Zijn de verladers gevrijwaard gebleven van de gevolgen van de schommelingen van de brandstofprijzen? Nee – VATOS Bunker Surcharge. Schadeloosstellen reders en vervoerders de lading voor de congestie die zij veroorzaken door verkeerd te anticiperen op de impact van hun ULCS op havens en terminals? Neen – VATOS Congestietoeslag.

Heeft de COVID-19 pandemie een negatieve invloed gehad op de resultaten van de vervoerders? Nee – integendeel, zij maken winsten nooit eerder gezien (Maersk Q3 2020 EBITDA +39% in vergelijking met Q3 2019, CMA-CGM +68%, ONE +78% enz… en voor MSC weten we het niet aangezien zij de resultaten in het geheim verborgen houden). Is de betrouwbaarheid van de dienstregeling verbeterd? Neen – integendeel die daalde tot een historisch dieptepunt zonder enige compensatie voor de lading. En het Suez incident zal het alleen maar erger maken. De impact van het Suez incident op de balans van volle en legen containers en stocks op de verschillende continenten belooft nog meer VATOS kosten voor de verladers.

Wanneer zullen de reders verantwoordelijk worden gesteld voor deze stand van zaken in de scheepvaart en de wereldwijde logistiek en zullen zij de rekening gepresenteerd krijgen voor de situatie die zij hebben gecreëerd? Wanneer zullen alle belanghebbenden rond de tafel gaan zitten en oplossingen vinden waarbij de nadruk ligt op het delen van de lasten en het toewijzen van de kosten op de juiste plank? Wie zal een dergelijk initiatief nemen? Zou het de top 5 van de sector kunnen zijn – Maersk, MSC, CMA-CGM, COSCO, Hapa Lloyd ++ ? Een grondige sanering is een must.

ULCS’s, loosing containers and the Suez Crisis.

Posted on maart 28, 2021Leave a comment

ULCS (Ultra Large Container Ships)

Will this be the eye-opener and wake-up call to the container shipping industry? Not likely but it does allow for some reflexion over the concept of ULCS’s and 20.000 ++ TEU vessels.

Some history I can share from my experience. In 1999-2000 did we meet up with the engineers of the yard who presented us their drawings for large container vessels. The Terminal & Ports Team focussed on some key questions. What is the LOA and beam of these ships? What can be the max. draft of these ships? How many rows wide will they carry? Based on the answers we concluded that there was not one single container terminal in the world able to handle these ships. Key challenge was the combination of max. draft, LOA and beam. We realised that we only could increase the beam – not the LOA – to limit the draft increase. It was then decided to start converting the terminals by installing the right cranes able to handle these ships. Yes, this was 20 years ago but the intake of these container vessels on the drawing board was to be 10.000 TEU hence half the intake capacity of today’s ULCS’s with an intake of 21.000+ TEU

Let’s make a small inventory of today’s ULCS’s. Example. HMM Algeciras. LOA 399,90. Intake in hold 9.932 TEU (11 deep) and on deck 14.032 TEU (9 high) – (wonder how containers can fall overboard?). Beam of 61 mtr. Max draft 16,2 mtr. Not many ports and terminals can handle these ships. It requires a deep-draft access, a berth of 430 mtr and more important depending on the possible ships list cranes with an outreach between 68 and 71 mtr not to speak of lift hight between 49 and 51 mtr. US Ports in general cannot handle these ships. Asia is likewise limited in capacity for these vessels and Europe has entered into critical berth capacity modus forcing these vessels to divert to alternative ports. European ports have become a bottleneck to global trade. On top of the current insufficient berth capacity for the ULCS’, the European Container Terminals fail to process the containers efficiently. No surprise that they fail to move 4.000 to 5.000 containers in less than 48 hrs from ships stowage to the hinterland and v.v. Trucks are queuing-up at gates. Barges lay idle for one week waiting to deliver and receive containers. Stakeholders continue to fail in exchanging key-data on the containers allowing efficient planning of operations and yard management. Last but not least; all players remain in a state of denial and continue to finger point to each other. Likewise they all keep claiming the cost of inefficiency on the cargo. Congestion charges on road haulage and inland navigation, shortages of equipment boosting freight rates to 10.000 Usd / FFE are frequent. You and I will ultimately pay the bill in the shops for more expensive clothing, shoes, food, electronics etc…

All these challenges are not new. A study I delivered in 2014 to the ARA Range port authorities and the Terminal Operators proved with facts and figures that the foundation of these problems where surfacing and unless urgently addressed would only aggravate in the near future. Today is that near future and it has aggravated to unacceptable levels. And it will not be resolved any time soon.

And all this under normal circumstances without a Suez crisis. Ship’s queuing-up in Suez is not the most challenging issue. In the hope that the Ever Given is cleared this Sunday 28/03 and the hundreds of container ships start moving east and west, the real challenge will show starting mid-April and continue to impact logistics till at least end June 2021 – at the very best. Meantime factories will halt due to lack of parts, product deliveries will have lay times exceeding weeks etc…

Loosing Containers

MSC Zoe on the Dutch coast – 200 containers. Maersk Eindhoven – 280 containers. One Apus 1.800 containers. APL England – 40 containers. Surprised when stacking 9 high on deck? Surprised when analysing the lashing systems on these ULCS’? Is it a matter of “Pride goes before the fall” as another way to describe arrogance? Or did cost savings when building these ships play a major factor? An urgent review of the lashing systems on these ships will be needed. Until than they should limit the deckstacks to max. 5 or 6 high. Can Nautical Authorities in the ports take initiatives and be responsible? Should they in view of these recent incidents consider ULCS with 9 high stowed deckcontainers as unsafe from a nautical viewpoint and prevent them from sailing? Or will the commercial pressure for ports encourage further denial of the issue and risk? Realising that most of the IMDG classified containers are deckstowed one can consider extended disaster scenario’s not being a question of “if” but “when”.

SUEZ Crisis

The crisis will not show in Suez. The impact will show in Asia and Europe where ports are today already challenged to serve all container vessels – not to speak of the 20.000 TEU ships.

Today and under normal circumstances and without a Suez crisis ships are queuing-up to enter ports and find a berth. No issue for the carriers – just bill the cargo with a congestion surcharge. It is becoming a habit and the miracle stick the carriers use is VATOS (Valid At Time Of Shipment). Carriers recovering the extra cost caused by their lack of competence to deliver efficient and effective shipping services is smartly handled through VATOS. So don’t worry, you and I will pay the end bill. Will carriers have the balls to apply a “Suez Event Surcharge” under VATOS?

In the hope that the Ever Given is cleared this Sunday 28/03 and the hundreds of container ships start moving east and west, the real challenge will show starting mid-April and continue to impact logistics till at least end June 2021 – at the very best. Meantime factories will halt due to lack of parts, product deliveries will have lay times exceeding weeks etc…

Wrap-up

Where is the feel of responsibility of the carriers? Have freight rates dropped and did shippers benefit from the economy of scale with the use of bigger ships – ULCS? No – on the contrary Asia/Europe went up to 10.000 Usd/FFE. Have shippers been kept clear from the effects of fuel price movements? No – VATOS Bunker Surcharge. Do carriers indemnify the cargo for the congestion they cause by wrongly anticipating on the impact of their ULCS on Ports and Terminals? No – VATOS Congestion Surcharge. Did the COVID-19 pandemic impact the results of the carriers negatively? No – on to the contrary they make profits never seen before (Maersk Q3 2020 EBITDA +39% compared to Q3 2019, CMA-CGM +68%, ONE +78% etc… and for MSC we don’t know as they keep the results secretly hidden). Did the schedule reliability improve? No – on the contrary it dropped to an all-time low with no compensation for the cargo.

When will the carriers be hold accountable for this state of affairs in shipping and global logistics and be presented with the bill for the situation they created? When will all stakeholders be gathering on one table and find solutions with focus on burden sharing and allocating the cost on the right shelf? Who will take such initiative? Could it be the Top 5 industry leaders – Maersk, MSC, CMA-CGM, COSCO, Hapa Lloyd ++ ? A deep clean-up is a must.